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We use a rational expectations framework to assess the implications of rising debt in an environment
with a "fiscal limit." The fiscal limit is defined as the point where the government no longer has the
ability to finance higher debt levels by increasing taxes, so either an adjustment to fiscal spending
or monetary policy must occur to stabilize debt. We give households a joint probability distribution
over the various policy adjustments that may occur, as well as over the timing of when the fiscal limit
is hit. One policy option that stabilizes debt is a passive monetary policy, which generates a burst of
inflation that devalues the existing nominal debt stock. The probability of this outcome places upward
pressure on inflation expectations and poses a substantial challenge to a central bank pursuing an inflation
target. The distribution of outcomes for the path of future inflation has a fat right tail, revealing that
only a small set of outcomes imply dire inflationary scenarios. Avoiding these scenarios, however,
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1 Introduction
Advanced economies are heading into an extended era of unresolved ﬁscal stress. Aging
populations imply that promised old-age beneﬁts are growing relentlessly as a share of the
economy. With no credible plans for ﬁnancing or reforming these entitlements programs,
economic agents in many large economies are facing unprecedented uncertainty about the
taxes they may face and the transfers they may receive in the future.
Table 1 encapsulates the unresolved ﬁscal stress in some large economies. An Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (2009) study computes the net present value impacts on ﬁscal deﬁcits
of aging-related spending as a share of GDP. Canada tops the list with a long-term budget
imbalance of 726 percent of GDP, but Spain and Korea are close behind. The average imbal-
ance across G-20 countries exceeds 400 percent of GDP. In the United States, the long-term
imbalance is about $75 trillion [Gokhale and Smetters (2007)]. Evidently, these numbers im-
ply that monetary and ﬁscal policies must change in the future. Most governments, however,
do little to inform their citizens of how policies will change and when they will change.
In the absence of clear and credible policies to resolve the ﬁscal stress, it is diﬃcult to
analyze the long-run macroeconomic consequences of those resolutions. This has led some
observers to predict dire consequences. In the United States, the Congressional Budget
Oﬃce annually produces long-term projections of the federal budget [Congressional Budget
Oﬃce (2010b)]. Their accounting exercise produces mile-high debt paths like those in ﬁgure
1, where the alternative scenario—which embeds tax and spending changes that the CBO
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Table 1: Net present value of impact on ﬁscal deﬁcit of aging-related spending, in percent
of GDP. Source: International Monetary Fund (2009).
deems likely—entails exponentially growing debt-GDP ratios.1 Congressional Budget Oﬃce
(2010a) is a speculative narrative of how growing U.S. government debt might result in a
ﬁscal crisis and how such a crisis might play out.
Academic economists have also speculated about the consequences of unresolved ﬁscal
stress. Kotlikoﬀ (2006), for example, has argued that the demographic shifts underlying
the CBOs projections in ﬁgure 1 imply that the United States is “bankrupt.” And many
policy-oriented pieces have been written that point to projections like these and warn of
possible ﬁscal crises [Rubin, Orszag, and Sinai (2004) and publications by the Committee
for a Responsible Federal Budget and Peter G. Peterson Foundation].
One recurring concern is that a ﬁscal crisis will ultimately lead to high or hyperinﬂation
[Unsigned (2010)]. Kotlikoﬀ (2006) has provocatively asserted that the United States “ap-
pears to be running the same type of ﬁscal policies that engendered hyperinﬂations in 20
countries over the last century” and similar statements appear in Kotlikoﬀ and Burns (2004).
An argument against this view, however, is that current long-term inﬂation expectations,
whether from surveys [Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, (2010)] or ﬁnancial market
data, as in ﬁgure 2, do not embed dire inﬂationary scenarios. In fact, policymakers in the
United States seem more concerned with deﬂation than with inﬂation these days [Bullard
(2010), Chan (2010)].
1These are accounting, as opposed to economic, exercises because, by the CBO’s own admission, ex-
ponentially growing debt is economically infeasible. In fact, these long-term projections build in a variety
of assumptions about the economy’s evolution over the projection period: within a few years, inﬂation is
constant at 2.5 percent, real interest rates at 3 percent, unemployment at 5 percent, and so on. Taken on
face value, the economy chugs along just ﬁne even as government debt explodes. The CBO reports then lapse




































Figure 1: Projections of U.S. federal government debt as a percentage of GDP from Con-
gressional Budget Oﬃce (2009b, 2010b).
This paper focuses on the narrow question of whether high or hyperinﬂation is a necessary
outgrowth of ﬁscal stress. To be sure, one can concoct scenarios in which ﬁscal policies refuse
to adjust to resolve the stress and monetary policy relinquishes its control of inﬂation by
fully accommodating ﬁscal deﬁcits with money creation, as in Sargent and Wallace (1981).
This outcome, however, does not strike us as the most plausible for the advanced economies.
These economies struggled for many years to get inﬂation under control and many have
now elevated low and stable inﬂation to an institutional feature of monetary policy through
the adoption of explicit inﬂation targets. Even in countries like the United States, which
have not adopted explicit inﬂation targets, low and stable inﬂation is widely accepted as the
central bank’s primary long-run mandate. Even if extremely high inﬂation is unlikely, some
inﬂation may be part of the package of policy adjustments that resolve the ﬁscal stress.
To understand the short- and long-run inﬂationary consequences of the current ﬁscal
position in advanced countries, we use a rational expectations framework to model the im-
















Figure 2: Monthly Yields on U.S. Treasury and Corporate Bonds. Source: International
Monetary Fund (2010)
plications of rising debt in an environment with a “ﬁscal limit.” The ﬁscal limit is deﬁned
as the point where the government no longer has the ability to ﬁnance higher debt levels
by increasing taxes, so either an adjustment to ﬁscal spending or to monetary policy must
occur to stabilize debt. We give households a joint probability distribution over the various
policy adjustments that may occur, as well as over the timing of when the ﬁscal limit is
hit. Interactions among policy adjustments and their timing are crucial to understanding
the macroeconomic outcomes that may arise.
The policy environment we consider is “orderly” in the sense that each possible regime—
deﬁned as the mix of monetary, tax, and transfers policies—would, in a stationary linear
model, deliver a unique rational expectations equilibrium. In one regime, tax rates are rising
to stabilize debt, while monetary policy is targeting inﬂation and promised transfer payments
are fully honored. At the ﬁscal limit, when tax rates are ﬁxed, one of two possible policy
mixes occurs: either monetary policy continues to target inﬂation and debt is stabilized by
delivering less-than-promised transfers or promised transfers are honored and monetary pol-
icy maintains the value of government debt by switching from inﬂation targeting to pegging
the nominal interest rate.
Not examined in this paper are policy combinations in which neither monetary nor ﬁscal
policy is stabilizing government debt. This can happen in a well-deﬁned rational expectations
equilibrium, so long as agents believe that such a regime is temporary and the policies will
eventually switch to stabilize debt [see Davig and Leeper (2010) for an example where the
4economy temporarily visits a regime in which macro policies are not sustainable]. Macroe-
conomic outcomes could be far more dire in environments in which policy fails to stabilize
debt, even temporarily.
There are three main ﬁndings of the paper. First, dire inﬂationary outcomes are possible,
but may not dominate measures of long-term inﬂationary expectations. This can happen
because, although rapid bursts of inﬂation are a feature of the equilibrium, they are very
low probability events that aﬀect inﬂation expectations only through the small probability
households attach to those bursts. In some respects, high inﬂation takes on the features of
a “peso problem.” The small probability attached to the dire inﬂation outcome matters for
the path of inﬂation because it generates a gradual upward drift in inﬂation expectations.
As households attach more probability to policymakers attempting to stabilize debt with
passive monetary policy, upward drift in inﬂation expectations and inﬂation become more
pronounced. This outcome poses a substantial challenge to central banks that aim to target
inﬂation. Second, the timing of policy adjustment matters for inﬂationary outcomes. The
binding upper limit on tax rates will necessitate some level of reneging on transfer payments
promised to households. We explore how the extent and timing of reneging depends on how
ﬁscal policy adjusts taxes prior to the ﬁscal limit and the maximum tax rate at the ﬁscal
limit. Third, the mix of policy adjustment matters for inﬂationary outcomes. We show that
inﬂationary pressures diﬀer according to [i] how aggressively taxes rise in response to rising
debt leading up to the ﬁscal limit, and [ii] the adjustment of ﬁscal and monetary policy at
the ﬁscal limit.
2 Literature Review
Our paper contributes to the large literature on how the uncertainty of policy aﬀects in-
ﬂation and other macroeconomic variables. The literature is too voluminous to cite every
worthy paper here, but our paper is most similar in spirit to that of Drazen and Helpman
(1990). They examine a simple endowment economy and show how uncertainty about policy
switches between expenditure cuts, tax increases or increases in money growth rates aﬀect
economic dynamics. They ﬁnd that the timing of uncertainty may induce seemingly perverse
correlations between the rate of inﬂation and the budget deﬁcit, at a time when the budget
deﬁcit is entirely responsible for inﬂation. We examine a much richer economic environment
and allow for more complex levels of uncertainty. We also focus on the relationship between
debt dynamics and inﬂationary outcomes, and show how the timing of uncertainty plays a
crucial role in the relationship between the two variables.
While the focus of the current paper is on the relationship between policy uncertainty
and inﬂation, the consequences of policy uncertainty extend beyond inﬂation dynamics. One
5stylized fact that has emerged from the comparative economics literature is that political
instability is inversely related to economic growth and foreign direct investment [Aizenman
and Marion (1993), Ramey and Ramey (1995), Brunetti and Weder (1998)]. Measures of
uncertainty about ﬁscal variables—measured as the standard deviation of government con-
sumption, government investment and average tax rates—are shown to be signiﬁcant and
negatively correlated with growth in both developed and developing economies. Aizenman
and Marion (1993) and Hopenhayn and Muniagurria (1996) study the eﬀects of policy uncer-
tainty in a neoclassical growth model with capital taxation that switches randomly between
high and low regimes. Policy uncertainty is deﬁned as the gap between the two regimes.
They ﬁnd that an increase in the degree of regime persistence and magnitude of policy ﬂuc-
tuations can have quantitatively large eﬀects on growth and welfare. One channel through
which uncertainty translates into slower growth arises when investment is irreversible, so that
uncertainty generates an option value for waiting [Bernanke (1983), Dixit (1989) Pindyck
(1988)].
The paper also abstracts from important political economy and distributional consid-
erations. Alesina and Drazen (1991) examine why ﬁscal policy can be so slow to adjust
even when there is agreement among political factions that stabilization policies need to
be implemented. They argue that political economy factors are of ﬁrst-order importance
and that stabilization policies typically beneﬁt the politically dominant groups. We ﬁnd
that inﬂationary outcomes are much more dire the longer it takes to implement the sta-
bilization policy, but we do not explicitly model the distributional consequences of such
policy. The generational and distributional eﬀects are emphasized in Auerbach and Koti-
likoﬀ (1987), Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (1998, 2007), ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and
Joines (1995), and Smetters and Walliser (2004). The canonical model used in these papers is
an overlapping generations model with each cohort living for 55 periods. The model permits
rich dynamics in demographics—population-age distributions, increasing longevity—intra-
generational heterogeneity, bequest motives, liquidity constraints, earnings uncertainty, and
so forth; this approach also allows for ﬂexibility in modeling ﬁscal variables and alternative
policy scenarios. While we do not assess the distributional eﬀects of alternative policies or
political economy aspects of policy choices, we are able to substantially increase the com-
plexity of policy uncertainty faced by individuals relative to the papers cited above. We also
examine monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions, while the papers cited above abstract from
monetary policy and are silent on the inﬂationary consequences of alternative ﬁscal policy
adjustments.
The focus of this paper is expected inﬂation, but the interpretation is amenable to under-
standing the behavior of bond markets. The failure of the rational expectations hypothesis
6of the term structure (REHTS) is a well known result for both U.S. data [Campbell and
Shiller (1987), Evans and Lewis (1994)] and international data [Jondeau and Ricart (1999)].
Two hypothesis have been proposed in the literature to reconcile theory with data. The
ﬁrst assumes time-varying risk premia explain the breakdown in the rational expectations
interpretation of the term structure [Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987), Dai and Singleton
(2002)]. Evans and Lewis (1994) argue that this hypothesis seems implausible because it
would require risk premia to be highly variable and potentially non-stationary. Following
Hamilton (1988), the second hypothesis models regime uncertainty in the U.S. term struc-
ture. Allowing for regime switching behavior improves the empirical ﬁt of term structure
models but also allows for a “peso problem” interpretation of the REHTS. The peso problem
can help explain the failure of the REHTS because it allows for a low probability, disastrous
state that will alter agents expectations of future inﬂation (and bond prices). Due to the
low probability of the event, it is unlikely to be observed in the data but agents acting ra-
tionally will condition on this regime.2 Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (2001) show that
a peso interpretation, coupled with a low volatility term premium, is consistent with U.S.,
U.K. and Germany term structure data. A majority of the literature devoted to testing the
REHTS is reduced form in nature. We contribute to this literature by providing a structural
interpretation of the reduced form econometric analysis.
3M o d e l
We employ a conventional neoclassical growth model with sticky prices, distorting income
taxation, and monetary policy. The model is similar to that of Davig, Leeper, and Walker
(2010).
3.1 Households An inﬁnitely-lived representative household has preferences over con-















































2Peso problems are analogous to the rare disaster literature [Barro (2009)].
7where 0 <β<1,σ > 0,η > 0,κ>0,χ > 0a n dν>0. Ct =







a composite good supplied by a ﬁnal-good producing ﬁrm that consists of a continuum of
individual goods ct(j), Nt denotes time spent working, and Mt/Pt are real money balances.
Kt−1 is the capital stock available to use in production at time t, Bt is one-period nominal
bond holdings, Mt is nominal money holdings, τt is the distorting tax rate, Rk
t is the real
rental rate of capital, Rt−1 is the nominal return to bonds, and Dt are proﬁts made by the
monopolistically competitive intermediate goods sector that are returned to the household
in the form of dividends.
The speciﬁcation of the transfers process is distinctive. Transfers are lump sum where zt
represents the amount promised to households and λtzt represents the fraction of promised
transfers actually received by the households. We elaborate on the process for λtzt below.
3.2 Firms We assume an intermediate goods sector that is monopolistically competitive
that produces a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods, and a ﬁnal goods producer which operates
in a perfectly competitive environment.
3.2.1 Production of Intermediate Goods Intermediate goods producing ﬁrm j has




where yt(j) is output of intermediate ﬁrm j and kt−1(j)a n dnt(j) are the amounts of capital







subject to the production technology given in (2), which yields the usual ﬁrst-order conditions










where Ψt(j) denotes real marginal cost.
3.2.2 Price Setting A ﬁnal goods producing ﬁrm purchases intermediate inputs at
nominal prices Pt (j) and produces the ﬁnal composite good using a constant-returns-to-
8scale technology given by
Yt =

























where Δt+s is the representative household’s stochastic discount factor, Dt (j) are nominal
proﬁts of ﬁrm j,a n dPt is the nominal aggregate price level.
Price adjustment follows Rotemberg (1982) quadratic costs of adjustment, which arise
whenever the newly chosen price, Pt(j), implies that actual inﬂation for good j deviates from






















where ϕ ≥ 0 parameterizes adjustment costs and we have used the demand function in (7)
to replace yt (j)i nﬁ r mj’s proﬁt function.
In a symmetric equilibrium, every intermediate goods producing ﬁrm faces the same
marginal costs, Ψt, and aggregate demand, Yt, so the pricing decision is the same for all ﬁrms,
implying Pt (j)=Pt. Note that in (9) the costs of adjusting prices subtracts from proﬁts
for ﬁrm j. In the aggregate, costly price adjustment shows up in the aggregate resource
constraint as








Yt = Yt (10)
3.3 Policy Specification The government ﬁnances purchases gt, and actual transfers,
λtzt, with capital and labor tax revenues, money creation, and the sale of one-period nominal





















In order to capture the potential non-stationary behavior of the transfers process, we





(1 − ρz)z∗ + ρzzt−1 + εt for Sz,t =1
μzt−1 + εt for Sz,t =2
(12)
where zt = Zt/Pt, |ρz| < 1, μ>1, μβ < 1,ε t ∼ N(0,σ 2
z). Regime 2 is characterized by μ>1
and βμ < 1, this allows the transfers process to be non-stationary, but square-summable in
discounted expectation. We use this process to capture the upward trend in transfers. The
regimes, Szt, follow a Markov chain that evolves according to
Πz =
 




where the regime with exploding promised transfers is an absorbing state. The expected
number of years until the switch from the stationary to nonstationary regime is (1 − pz)−1.
The exponential growth in transfers is initially ﬁnanced by new debt issuance, which
is backed by increasing tax rates. However, as emphasized in Davig, Leeper, and Walker
(2010), there is a “ﬁscal limit” to the amount of debt that can be ﬁnanced through tax
increases. This is due to either reaching the peak of the Laﬀer curve or political resistance
to tax hikes. We model this as setting τt = τmax for t ≥ T,w h e r eT i st h ed a t ea tw h i c ht h e










for Sτ,t =1 ,t<T (Below Fiscal Limit)
τmax for Sτ,t =2 ,t≥ T (Fiscal Limit)
(14)
where b∗ is the target debt-output ratio and τ∗ is the steady-state tax rate.
As in Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010), we assume the probability of hitting the ﬁscal
limit, pLt, follows a logistic function
pL,t =
exp(η0 + η1 (τt−1 − τ∗))
1+e x p ( η0 + η1 (τt−1 − τ∗))
, (15)
where η1 < 0. Thus, the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit is increasing in taxes. Be-
cause taxes respond passively to government debt, the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit
increases with debt. Households are aware of the maximum tax rate, τmax, but the precise
timing of when that rate takes eﬀect is uncertain.
Monetary policy is conventional in that it sets the short-term nominal interest rate in
10pZ pL








Figure 3: Evolution of the economy. Policies begin in state 1 with passive tax policy, active
monetary policy, and a stationary transfers process. Transfers switch to a non-stationary
process (Sz = 2) with probability pZ. With probability pL, the economy hits the ﬁscal limit
and tax policy transits to Sτ = 2. At the ﬁscal limit, with probability q, monetary policy
becomes passive (Sm = 2) while transfers policy remains active (λt = 1); with probability
1−q, monetary policy remains active (Sm = 1), while transfers policy becomes passive (λt ∈
[0,1)). With probability p11, the regime remains passive monetary/active transfers policy and
with probability 1−p11, the economy enters the absorbing state of active monetary/passive
transfers policy.
response to deviations of inﬂation from its target
Rt = R
∗ + α(πt − π
∗) (16)
where π∗ is the target inﬂation rate. Following Leeper (1991), monetary policy is “active”
when α>1/β, so policy satisﬁes the Taylor principle. We label the active regime as Sm,t =1 .
Policy is “passive” when 0 ≤ α<1/β,(Sm,t =2 ) .
Figure 3 displays the evolution of the economy. The economy is initialized with stationary
transfers, passive ﬁscal and active monetary policy. With probability pz, the transfers process
becomes non-stationary, Sz = 2. The economy reaches the ﬁscal limit with probability pL,
tax policy becomes active Sτ = 2 and transfers are assumed to be reduced by λt ∈ [0,1].3
Upon reaching the ﬁscal limit, with probability q, monetary policy becomes passive (Sm =2 )
while transfers policy remains active (λt = 1); with probability 1−q, monetary policy remains
active (Sm = 1), while transfers policy becomes passive (λt ∈ [0,1)). We assume that the
active monetary / passive transfers regime is an absorbing state. The economy will transition
out of the passive monetary / active transfers regime with probability 1 − p11.
3The amount of reneging is determined endogenously such that the government’s ﬂow budget constraint
clears.
114C a l i b r a t i o n
The parameters over preferences, technology and price adjustment are consistent with the
values in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003). We calibrate the model at
an annual frequency because the purpose of the model is to study the impact of ﬁscal policy
over a relatively long horizon. Intermediate-goods producing ﬁrms markup the price of their
good by 15 percent over marginal cost, so μ = θ(1 − θ)−1 =1 .15. The price adjustment
parameter is set to imply relatively modest price rigidities, ϕ = 10.4 The annual real interest
rate is set to 2 percent, which implies β = .98. Preferences over consumption and leisure
are logarithmic, σ =1a n dη = −1. We set χ so the steady state share of time spent in
employment is 0.33. Steady state inﬂation is set to 2 percent and the initial steady state debt-
output ratio in the regime with stationary transfers is set to 0.4. For real money balances,
we set δ so velocity in the deterministic steady state, deﬁned as cP/M, corresponds to the
average U.S. monetary base velocity at 2.4.5 The interest elasticity of real money balances,
κ, is set to 2.6, which is consistent with Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000).
Average federal government purchases are a constant 8 percent share of output. In the
regime with stationary transfers, z∗ is calibrated so steady state transfers are 9 percent of
output. We also allow a small, but persistent, stochastic variation in the transfers process,
ρZ = .9. Monetary policy is active in the regime with stationary transfers, where the reaction
of the nominal interest rate to inﬂation obeys the Taylor principle, so α =1 .5. The inﬂation
target is 2 percent, π∗ =2 .0. Fiscal policy is passive in the regime with stationary transfers
with γ = .15. The steady state debt-to-output ratio in the regime with stationary transfers
is .4, which determines b∗ and implies that the average tax rate is .198 (i.e. τ∗ = .1980). This
value is consistent with the average tax rate in the U.S. reported in ﬁgure 4. The expected
duration of the regime with stationary transfers is ﬁve years, which gives pz = .8. This value
roughly corresponds to the amount of time that exists before the CBO projects transfers will
begin their sustained upward trajectory [Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009a)]. Again using
CBO estimates, transfers grow at 1 percent per year once the switch from the stationary to
non-stationary regime occurs, μ =1 .01.
After the switch to the regime with exponentially growing transfers, the same monetary
and ﬁscal rules remain in place until the economy hits the ﬁscal limit. The probability
of hitting the ﬁscal limit increases as debt and taxes rise, being driven by the growth in
transfers. The probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit is time varying and obeys the logistic
4As an example of the magnitude of this number, suppose that 66 percent of ﬁrms cannot reset their price
each period in a Calvo setting, then a calibration at a quarterly frequency would suggest ϕ would be around
70. Prices are more ﬂexible at an annual frequency, so ϕ = 10 captures a modest price of cost adjustment.
5See Davig and Leeper (2006) for further details.





























































































Figure 4: A Measure of the U.S. Federal Tax Rate. The ﬁgure plots total nominal Federal
tax revenue, including personal, corporate, and social insurance taxes, divided by nominal
GDP. The ﬁgure also plots the maximum tax rate for the calibrated model (τmax).
function (15). η0 and η1 are set so that the initial probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit is 2
percent. The probability rises as debt and taxes increase and reaches roughly 20 percent by
2075.
At the ﬁscal limit, tax rates are required to remain constant, since the assumption em-
bedded in the model is that further distortionary tax ﬁnancing beyond a given point is no
longer available. The limit is clearly unknown, so we assess diﬀerent values, but take the
benchmark value to be τmax = .2425. Figure 4 shows that this value is well above the post-
war average U.S. Federal tax rate. In the regime with stationary transfers, this tax rate
supports a steady state debt-output ratio of 2.3, which is an unprecedented level for the
United States. Similarly, an average tax rate of τmax = .2425 has no historic precedent, as is
evident from ﬁgure 4. However, since transfers are well above their value in the stationary
regime when the economy hits the ﬁscal limit, the level at which debt stabilizes is well below
this.
Since higher tax rates are no longer available to stabilize debt at the ﬁscal limit, we allow
two potential resolutions. The ﬁrst resolution, which is temporary, is a switch to passive
monetary policy that is expected to last 10 years. In this scenario, the monetary authority
pegs the nominal interest rate (α = 0) and the ﬁscal authority continues to fully deliver on its
promised transfers. Promised transfers continue to grow, however, and eventually outstrip
the capacity of the government to meet its promised obligations. With probability p11, policy
13switches to a setting where the ﬁscal authority reneges on transfers and monetary policy turns
active. The second resolution stabilizes debt by reneging on promised transfers payments.
Under this scenario, monetary policy remains active. The regime that reneges on transfers
is absorbing: eventually, the economy transitions to a state in which lump-sum transfers
stabilize debt (i.e., the government reneges on its promised transfers), constant distorting
tax rates and active monetary policy. At the ﬁscal limit, the benchmark calibration places
a 50 percent chance on passive monetary policy and on reneging. The path of inﬂation,
however, depends importantly on the weight households attach to each resolutions, so we
report the impact on the economy of alternative weights on each outcome.
We solve the model numerically using the monotone map method described in Davig and
Leeper (2006).
5R e s u l t s
An often cited objection to the possibility that high levels of U.S. debt will be inﬂated away
is that the long-end of the Treasury yield curve does not appear to embed dramatically
higher inﬂation expectations or inﬂation risk premia.6 Similarly, survey-based measures of
inﬂation expectations are stable [Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, (2010)]. To preview
results, we ﬁnd that the average inﬂation for the calibrated model is in line with survey
expectations and bond market participants. That is, the “unfunded liabilities” problem does
not lead to substantial inﬂationary pressures in our model. However, this is a delicate result.
Deviations from policy rules that anchor long-run expectations will push the expectation of
mean inﬂation higher. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the tail risk associated with long-run ﬁscal
stress to be very large.
5.1 Objects of Interest To understand how various factors aﬀect inﬂation dynamics
in our model, we examine three objects of interest:
1. Decision Rules. The model is solved using the monotone map method described in
Coleman (1991). The ﬁrst step in the solution algorithm is to discretize the state space
around the nonstochastic steady state for each state variable (i.e. Θt = {Kt−1,z t,b t−1,
Rt−1,m t−1,S j,t}), where j denotes various regimes. The second step is to conjecture an
initial set of decision rules for the capital stock, labor, marginal costs and inﬂation.7
Denote the initial rules as   hK
j (Θt)=Kt,   hN
j (Θt)=Nt,   h
ψ
j (Θt)=ψt and   hπ
j(Θt)=πt
for j = 0. We then substitute these decision rules into the household’s ﬁrst-order
6See, for example, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2010).
7We initially solved a simpliﬁed version of the model with stationary transfers and either AM/PT or
PM/AT policy. We then used weighted combinations of these rules as the initial conjectures.
14necessary conditions. In turn, the t + 1 dated endogenous variables depend on Θt+1.
Numerical integration is used to integrate over the exogenous variables. For a given
point on the state space, this procedure yields a nonlinear system of equations. Solving
this system for state variables at each point in the state space yields updated values
for the decision rules (e.g.   hK
j+1(Θt)=Kt). We then repeat this step until the decision
rules converge at every point in the state space (|  hK
j (Θt) −   hK
j+1(Θt)| <  ).8
Once the decision rules converge, we can examine how inﬂation changes with a change
in policy regime. As an example, consider ﬁgure 5, which will explained more fully be-
low. This ﬁgure plots inﬂation against debt for the passive monetary / active transfers
regime and the active monetary / passive transfers regime. All other state variables
are set to steady state values, which implies the decision rules are to be interpreted
as an approximation to equilibrium outcomes. The nodes (circles and stars) represent
exact solutions (convergence points) to the model. A ﬁner discretization of the state
space and nonlinear interpolation yields the solid lines. The dashed lines represent
extrapolation beyond the last point of convergence.
2. Term Structure of Inﬂation. To understand how altering parameter values or pol-
icy rules aﬀects inﬂation expectations, we run 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations of the
economy, with each simulation lasting 40 periods. With the economy calibrated at an
annual frequency, each simulation shows the dynamic path of the economy through the

















where st+k,t is the average expected rate of inﬂation over the next k periods, and
N denotes the number of simulations. Results reported below are robust to alterna-
tive measures of average inﬂation (e.g., mean values for inﬂation at various horizons).
We use this deﬁnition because it corresponds to how survey-based expectations are
reported.
3. Tail Expectation of Inﬂation. As a tail measure of inﬂation, we use the Monte Carlo
simulations to calculate the average of inﬂation outcomes at each date in the upper
0.005 percentile. If we have N simulations from the model, this statistic is calculated
by ordering the π
(n)
t , n =1 ,...N, at each date and taking the average of the highest
8As evidence of local uniqueness, we perturb the converged decision rules in various dimensions and
check that the algorithm converges back to the same solution. We restrict our attention to solutions on the
minimum set of state variables.



















Active Monetary / Passive Transfers
Passive Monetary / Active Transfers
Figure 5: Relationship between net inﬂation and debt at the ﬁscal limit for the passive
monetary, active transfers regime, and the active monetary, passive transfers regime.









t I[T ,∞) (18)
where T denotes the percentile of interest, πT denotes the value of inﬂation at the T th
percentile, and I(T ,∞) is an indicator function that is set to one if the value for inﬂation
is equal to or greater than the T th percentile.9
5.2 Fiscal Variables and Inflation In order to isolate the expectational eﬀects as-
sociated with hitting the ﬁscal limit, ﬁgure 5 plots the decision rules for inﬂation against
debt in the two regimes that arise at the ﬁscal limit. As noted above, we plot decision rules
by setting all state variables, with the exception of debt and inﬂation, to steady state values.
The ﬁgure shows that for relatively high (low) debt-output ratios, hitting the ﬁscal limit and
switching to a passive monetary policy / active transfers policy produces a sharp increase
(decrease) in inﬂation.
The intuition for this result follows from the equilibrium condition that links the value
of nominal government liabilities to the net present value of surpluses plus seigniorage rev-
9Both the tail measure of inﬂation and the term structure of inﬂation rely upon convergence properties of
the Monte Carlo simulations. Theorem 3.1.1 of Geweke (2005) gives conditions under which the moments are
well approximated by sample counterparts. While we are unable to prove that these conditions are satisﬁed
analytically, several numerical checks where conducted to ensure the conditions are satisﬁed locally.
16enue. The value of government debt can be obtained by imposing equilibrium, including the
transversality condition for asset accumulation, on the government’s ﬂow constraint, taking































and 1 + Rt =[ EtΔt,t+1]−1. The value of nominal government liabilities depends on the ex-
pected present value of taxes less the expected present value of transfers and government
spending plus seigniorage. An upward revision to tax revenue will raise the value of govern-
ment debt, while an upward revision to transfers will lower the value of debt.
The mechanism for achieving the equality in (19) depends upon the combination of ﬁscal
and monetary policies in place. A passive ﬁscal policy is one in which ﬁscal variables adjust
to ensure that (19) holds, which allows monetary policy to eﬀectively target the price level
(active monetary policy). Recall that at the ﬁscal limit, tax policy enters an absorbing
regime and is set at τmax. A passive transfers policy–when agents receive a fraction of
promised transfers–is then the only way to achieve the active monetary policy outcome.
This explains why the line representing the active monetary / passive transfers (AM/PT)
regime in ﬁgure 5 does not vary with the debt-output ratio. So long as transfers passively
adjust to satisfy (19), then monetary policy can eﬀectively target the price level.
If ﬁscal variables are unable to passively adjust to satisfy (19), then the adjustment must
come from the price level Pt and/or the real interest rate. Cochrane (2010) provides an
interpretation of this regime in which “aggregate demand” can be thought of as the mirror
image of demand for government debt. Any event that reduces the household’s assessment
of the value of the government debt they hold (e.g., explosive transfers coupled with a ﬁxed
tax rate and high debt-GDP ratio) will cause households to shed debt by converting it into
demand for consumption goods, which in turn leads to higher prices.
Unfortunately, our model cannot be neatly categorized into either the PM/AT regime
or the AM/PT regime. Price level determination depends crucially on understanding how
agents form conditional expectations over regimes. A rational expectations equilibrium in
this model carries with it an assumption of very sophisticated agents. When taking the
expectation in (19), agents are placing equal probability, q, on going to the PM/AT regime
17and the AM/PT regime, once the economy reaches the ﬁscal limit.
The debt-output ratio plays an important role in expectation formation. Prior to hitting
the ﬁscal limit, agents are aware that the tax sequence and the probability of hitting the
ﬁscal limit are explicit functions of real debt (see, (14)a n d( 15)). Relatively low values of
real debt signal to agents [i] a relatively low sequence of future taxes and [ii] a relatively low
probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit. Moreover, [ii] implies that agents are more likely to
continue to receive the promised level of transfer payments. A relatively low debt-output
ratio is one that can be supported by current tax policy. Recall that the tax rate at the
ﬁscal limit supports a debt-output ratio of 2.3 at the initial steady state level of transfers.
However transfers grow exponentially, and the level of debt that the higher tax rate supports
will depend on the level of transfers when the ﬁscal limit is hit. This level will be much lower
than the debt-output ratio of 2.3. The PM/AT line crosses the AM/PT line at the point
where τmax is exactly able to oﬀset the explosive growth in transfers (debt-output ratio of
roughly 0.87).
Figure 5 shows that debt-output levels to the left of this point have deﬂationary con-
sequences when the regime switches from active to passive monetary policy at the ﬁscal
limit. This is because prior to hitting the ﬁscal limit, the lower value of debt portends a low
sequence of future taxes and a low probability of reneging on transfers. Thus, the adjust-
ment of taxes to the upper bound of τmax when the economy hits the ﬁscal limit generates
a large positive reevaluation of debt. The upward revision to the expected path for primary
surpluses dampens demand for goods and raises the value of government debt, generating
the deﬂationary outcome depicted in the ﬁgure. The positive reevaluation of debt holds in
spite of the active transfers policy. This is because agents eventually put probability one
on the passive transfers policy regime (since the passive transfers regime is an absorbing
state). Therefore the positive reevaluation with respect to the change in the tax sequence is
much larger than the negative one associated with transfers. This deﬂationary pressure is
ampliﬁed by the adjustment of the stochastic discount factor, which, as (20) shows, increases
with deﬂationary pressures.
For high levels of debt, these eﬀects are reversed. Leading up to the ﬁscal limit, transfers
are growing exponentially. As debt accumulates, agents recognize that the increase in taxes
to τmax at the ﬁscal limit is not enough to oﬀset the growth in transfers. A switch from
active to passive monetary policy generates a downward revision to primary surpluses and
a positive wealth eﬀect, which leads to inﬂation. The positive reevaluation with respect to
the change in the tax sequence is much smaller now because higher debt levels imply agents
place much greater probability on hitting the ﬁscal limit. This, in turn, generates a positive
wealth eﬀect which increases aggregate demand and hence the inﬂation rate.



















Figure 6: Comparison of alternative tax rules: higher γ implies a larger response of tax rates
to debt before the ﬁscal limit is reached.
5.3 Response of Taxes to Debt, γ Much of the recent discussion of ﬁscal policy
centers on ﬁscal retrenchment (see, Leeper (2010)). On the heels of implementing large and
coordinated increases in government spending, the discussion has turned to increasing tax
rates and/or reducing government spending. Much of the impetus for the discussion seems
to be the long-run considerations discussed in the introduction. Within the context of our
model, we are able to address the following question: How will inﬂation change if taxes
respond more aggressively to debt? Prior to hitting the ﬁscal limit, γ governs the extent to
which the tax rate responds to the debt-to-GDP ratio. According to (14), higher values for
γ imply the current tax rate responds more aggressively to last period’s deviation from the
steady-state debt level, b∗.
Figure 6 plots the decision rules for γ =0 .10 and γ =0 .15. A policy that raises taxes
more aggressively in response to rising debt—a higher value for γ—decreases the level of
inﬂation if the level of debt is not too high. The intuition for this result is straightforward:
a higher tax rate coupled with low debt keeps the economy away from the ﬁscal limit longer.
But the relationship between debt, taxes, and inﬂation is nonlinear. In this model, a higher
distortionary tax reduces work eﬀort which depresses output and increases marginal costs.
This leads to an increase in inﬂationary pressures. Thus, distortionary taxation has two
opposing eﬀects on inﬂation. For relatively low values of debt, higher distorting taxes keep
the economy away from the ﬁscal limit longer. This reduces inﬂationary pressures and
dominates the increase in inﬂation due to the cost-push shock associated with higher marginal
19costs. For low or moderate levels of debt, the result continues to hold; the economy with a
more aggressive tax policy has lower inﬂation.
As debt rises to high levels, this result is reversed; the economy with a more aggressive
tax policy eventually sees realizations with higher levels of inﬂation. This is because with
high levels of debt, the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit is much higher for higher γ.
The consequences of hitting the ﬁscal limit begin to dominate, which, coupled with the
inﬂationary pressures of increasing marginal costs, leads to higher inﬂation. Comparing two
economies with high debt levels, the economy with a less aggressive tax policy has more
room to raise taxes and increases revenues to combat the exponential growth in transfers,
keeping it away from the ﬁscal limit longer.
5.4 Probability of Passive Monetary Policy, q Once the ﬁscal limit is hit, eﬀec-
tively targeting the price level with monetary policy would require a passive transfers policy
(transfers would adjust passively such that (19) holds). From a political economy perspec-
tive, the probability of passive transfers may be much more diﬃcult to achieve than the
1/2 probability assumed in the baseline calibration. What if at the ﬁscal limit the political
economy landscape makes it very diﬃcult to transition into the regime with passive transfers
and active monetary policy?
Figure 7 compares the path of 10-year average expected inﬂation given by (17) under
diﬀerent assumptions regarding the probability of monetary policy turning passive at the
limit. If households place low probability on this transition, such as the scenario that sets
q = .25, then households expect with high probability the government to renege on promised
transfer payments. By reducing the promised transfers appropriately, monetary policy is
able to maintain only a slight deviation from target.
As households place greater probability on passive monetary policy at the ﬁscal limit, the
trajectory of expected inﬂation bends upward. Under this scenario, households anticipate
collecting transfer payments in full even after hitting the ﬁscal limit. The deviations from
target inﬂation are still benign even when households expect to transition into the passive
monetary / active transfers regime with probability q =0 .75. One reason for this mild
inﬂationary outcome is due to the assumption that the active monetary / passive transfers
regime is an absorbing state. Relaxing this assumption would change the quantitative result
but not the main message of ﬁgure 7: at the ﬁscal limit, the longer the agents expect to
receive the promised level of transfer payments, the larger the wealth eﬀect and the greater
the impact on inﬂation.
5.5 Probability of Hitting Fiscal Limit, pL Figure 8 plots the 10-year average
expected rate of inﬂation under the baseline calibration, which allows the probability to rise






















































































Figure 7: Average 10-year expected inﬂation rates. Comparing probability distributions of
passive monetary policy at the ﬁscal limit: higher q implies a higher probability of passive
monetary policy at the ﬁscal limit.






















































































Rising probability of hitting the fiscal limit
Constant probability of hitting the fiscal limit
Figure 8: Average 10-year expected inﬂation rates. Time-varying probability versus constant
probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit.




























Figure 9: Right tail of inﬂation distribution. Reports the average of inﬂation outcomes at
each date in the upper .005 percentile tail.
as taxes increase, along with a parameterization of the model that assumes the probability
of hitting the ﬁscal limit is constant (i.e. pL,t = .02 for all t). As debt and taxes rise, the
benchmark version of the model that attaches increasing probability mass to hitting the
ﬁscal limit generates a steeper trajectory for expected inﬂation. The reason for the more
rapidly rising inﬂation expectations is that the household deems that it is more likely that
the economy will hit the ﬁscal limit than under the version of the model that assumes the
probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit is constant.
A surprising implication of all these variations, however, is how benign the various paths
appear in terms of the inﬂation outlook. Clearly, massive inﬂation due to ﬁscal proﬂigacy
does not appear to be the mean forecast in any of the scenarios. Even settings where passive
monetary policy at the ﬁscal limit is the more likely outcome, as shown by the solid line in
ﬁgure 7, inﬂation expectations rise only slowly, with 10-year inﬂation expectations below 4
percent annually. The expected outcome, however, masks the range of inﬂationary outcomes
that can emerge. Under poorly coordinated policy regimes, the next section illustrates that
the tail outcomes of the inﬂationary distribution are quite severe.
5.6 Tail Outcomes Average expectations reported in the previous section mask some
important features of the underlying distribution of future inﬂation. Expected inﬂation has
a fat and long right tail, which expected values or even conﬁdence bands do not fully reveal.






























Fiscal limit = 2037
Fiscal limit = 2042
Fiscal limit = 2047
Fiscal limit = 2052
Figure 10: Actual inﬂation paths. Realized inﬂation when the ﬁscal limit is hit at various
years.
To illustrate, ﬁgure 9 shows the average of the highest .005 percentile of inﬂation outcomes
at each date. The takeoﬀ point at which the tail embeds sharply higher rates of inﬂation
occurs around 2035. At this date, the tax rate at the ﬁscal limit, which is set to .2425, is
not suﬃcient to back the existing debt stock without an increase in the price level. If the
maximum tax rate is higher (lower), the takeoﬀ point in tail inﬂation outcomes would be
later (earlier) than the 2035 date.
The tail outcomes emerge under scenarios where the government does not renege on any
promised beneﬁts and monetary policy turns passive at ﬁscal limit. The simulations reveal
that the worst inﬂation outcomes will arise if ﬁscal policy delivers on all its promised transfers,
raises taxes steadily and is able to limp by without hitting the ﬁscal limit for approximately
25 years. At around 2035, the high inﬂation outcomes will then begin emerging if monetary
policy turns passive. High inﬂation outcomes can be quite bad by the standards of most
countries in recent years, possibly getting as high as 50 percent at the end of the simulation
period.
Figure 9 is misleading in some respects, however, because it reports the worst inﬂation
outcome at each date in the monte carlo simulation and not the worst single path of inﬂation.
To illustrate the worst-case scenarios, ﬁgure 10 reports particular realized paths of inﬂation,
where each path diﬀers in when the economy hits the ﬁscal limit. The longer debt and taxes
grow without hitting the limit, the larger is the resulting spike in the price level if monetary
policy turns passive. Ever-increasing inﬂation spikes arise from their correspondingly higher

















































Figure 11: Left tail of λt in the transfers policy. Reports the average λt outcomes at each
date in the lower .005 percentile tail.
level of debt: the longer the economy persists before hitting the ﬁscal limit, the more debt
accumulates, and the larger is the burst of inﬂation. Figure 10 essentially reports the upper
envelope of the bursts of inﬂation that occur at each date for the simulations that draw a
passive monetary policy at the ﬁscal limit.
A central message emerging from the model is that high inﬂation is a tail event and as
a consequence, exerts only a modest inﬂuence on measures of average expected inﬂation.
These dynamics may nonetheless prove dangerous if policymakers discount the prospects for
high inﬂation because measures of inﬂation expectations could remain mostly stable. If the
dangers are discounted and no policy reforms are taken—all promised transfers are delivered
and monetary policy is active—then these are precisely the set of outcomes that give rise to
the tail events.
To guard against these tail outcomes for inﬂation, in this model the ﬁscal authorities
must renege on some share of promised beneﬁts. Given the calibration of the model, the
extent of reneging does not need to be extreme over the next 20 or so years. For example,
ﬁgure 11 reports the mean of the .005 percentile tail of the distribution for the variable
that measures the extent of transfer reneging, the λt appearing in the household’s and the
government’s budget constraints. In the most extreme simulations, modest reneging begins
shortly after 2012 and continues through 2035. Reneging then accelerates after 2035 due to
the inability of ﬁscal policy to further raise taxes to fund transfers. Ultimately, in the face



































































Figure 12: Date when actual transfer fall to zero (i.e., Full Reneging—λt = 0) for alternative
ﬁscal limits (dashed line is a spline interpolation).
of exponential growth of transfers, reneging is complete (λt = 0) and the economy settles
into a new steady state equilibrium. Under a scenario where ﬁscal policy begins reneging
on transfers to stabilize debt, monetary policy is freed to pursue its inﬂation target, which
removes the threat of a tail inﬂationary outcome.
One key dimension of uncertainty is the tax rate associated with the ﬁscal limit. The
baseline parameterization sets the value to .2425, which is consistent with a steady-state debt
equal to 230 percent of output at the level of transfers in 2010. To assess how the future
paths of inﬂation, transfers and debt may evolve under alternative maximum tax rates, we
turn to a sensitivity analysis to this parameter.
Figure 12 reports the path of transfers under diﬀerent values for the maximum tax rate
at the ﬁscal limit. In the case of a relatively low rate at the limit, the maximum tax rate
available to the ﬁscal authorities is .22, which is consistent with steady-state debt equal to
170 percent of output at the level of transfers at 2010. In this case, actual transfers begin to
fall below their promised levels within the next few years and are completely reneged upon
starting in 2046. In the case of the least binding ﬁscal limit we consider, the tax rate is .25
and corresponds to steady-state debt equal to 260 percent of output. In this case, transfers
are not fully reneged on until after 2055.
256 Concluding Remarks
Advanced economies are heading into an extended era of unresolved ﬁscal stress. Is hy-
perinﬂation a necessary outgrowth of this stress? Within the context of a rational expec-
tations model, we ﬁnd that dire inﬂationary outcomes are possible, but may not be very
likely outcomes for advanced economies. Although rapid bursts of inﬂation are a feature of
the equilibrium, they are very low probability events that aﬀect inﬂation expectations only
through the small probability households attach to those bursts. However, as households
attach more probability to policymakers attempting to stabilize debt with passive mone-
tary policy, upward drift in inﬂation expectations and inﬂation become more pronounced.
This ﬁnding sends a warning to policymakers aiming to target inﬂation. Without signiﬁcant
and meaningful ﬁscal policy adjustment, the task of meeting inﬂation targets will become
increasingly diﬃcult.
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